Log Analysis API

Overview

Send one log file, get back findings. One call, one answer — the response carries the completed analysis, not a job id to poll.

There are two routes, and which one you use depends on whether the caller holds a credential:

Route	Credential	Files per request	Shape
POST /api/v1/log-analyses	API key (lgp_live_), session JWT, or legacy partner key	1	Synchronous by default — the reply IS the analysis
POST /api/v1/log-analytics/{name}	None, with {name} registered by an operator — or an API key (lgp_live_, since 2026-10-07)	up to 1000	Synchronous by default since 25 Sep 2026 — 202 with a batchId only past 16MB or 10 images

Either route takes a file that fits in one request. A file that does not is uploaded in parts through the same credential — see A file bigger than one request.

Served by AI Service on port 9300.

Getting a name for the open route

The {name} in /api/v1/log-analytics/{name} is not something a request chooses. A Logrite operator registers a name against your workspace, per estate: a name registered on dev does not exist on production. Measured 2026-10-01, the demo name acme answers 200 on dev-aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/acme/limits and 404 {"status":"error","error":{"code":"NOT_FOUND","message":"Not found"}} on aiservice.logrite.ai — exactly what any unregistered name answers.

To get one, ask Logrite support (or your Logrite operator) to register a name for your workspace on the estate you will call. The examples on this page write it as <your-registered-name>. If you hold an API key you do not need a name at all: use POST /api/v1/log-analyses.

History

This page is the reference. The dated record of how the API changed — the 3 and 9 September releases, the 25 September switch to synchronous-by-default, and the screenshot and batch-prose work — is on Log Analysis API — change history.

Authenticate

Use a Logrite API key. Create one in the app under Sandbox → API keys — it starts with lgp_live_, and you choose its lifetime when you create it (30 days, 90 days, 1 year or no expiry; creating one needs the Admin or Owner role). Send it as a bearer token:

curl -s -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer lgp_live_…" \
  -H "x-filename: app.log" --data-binary @app.log

• The key must be in Authorization: Bearer. Sent as X-API-Key it is not read, and the route answers 401 missing_bearer.
• A key expires at the end of the lifetime chosen, and a revoked or rotated-away key stops working at once. Both answer 401 ("That API key was not accepted."). Create or rotate a key in Sandbox → API keys; the AI Service holds no key material and asks the backend about every key, so a revocation takes effect here immediately.
• The key acts as the person who created it, in the workspace it was created in. Every analysis it submits is scoped to that workspace, and no request field can change it.

Two other credentials are accepted on the same route:

• Session token — the JWT the application itself uses. Short-lived, so not suited to a server-to-server integration.
• Partner key (legacy) — a static secret:workspaceId:label entry an operator configures in the AI Service’s LOG_ANALYSIS_API_KEYS. It is checked first, reaches only this route and its workspace, and is kept for integrations issued one before lgp_live_ keys existed. New integrations should use an API key.

Without a credential, the open route relies on {name} being a name an operator registered against a workspace: an unregistered segment is a 404, so the URL simply does not exist. A route that accepted a bare workspace id with no credential would let any caller write into any tenant by typing its number.

API keys on the upload routes (2026-10-07). The POST /api/v1/log-analytics/{name} family also accepts an lgp_live_ key as Authorization: Bearer …. Before, the offered credential went through the JWT-only guard and a valid key answered 401 INVALID_CREDENTIAL (“jwt malformed”) — measured on dev by the cortex_consistency.py setup. The key is now checked with the backend like on every other key route (503 if the backend cannot be asked), and the workspace comes from the key.

Analyse a file

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>" \
  -F "file=@./application.log"

A raw body works too, with the name in a header — useful for pipes:

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>" \
  -H "X-Filename: application.log" \
  --data-binary @application.log

Any content type is accepted, including none. Plain text, newline-delimited JSON, a JSON array of records, and CSV are all read; the body is read as bytes whatever it declares itself to be.

A gzipped file is decompressed first, detected by its magic bytes rather than its name, and the size limits apply to the DECOMPRESSED bytes — so a file cannot be gzipped past the ceiling. Zip, 7z, xz and zstd are refused by name with 415 UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT rather than read as though they were text.

Several files in one request

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>" \
  -F "file=@./app-1.log" -F "file=@./app-2.log" -F "dataset=nightly-batch"

One request is one batch. The reply is a 202 carrying the batchId before any analysis starts, and the work continues after the connection closes:

{
  "batchId": "BATCH-06e15fd9",
  "status": "RUNNING",
  "statusUrl": "/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>/BATCH-06e15fd9",
  "pollAfterMs": 2000,
  "files": [
    { "fileId": "FILE-aef3e7", "filename": "app-1.log", "sizeBytes": 258,
      "datasetId": "log-analytics-3952-nightly-batch", "status": "QUEUED",
      "fileUrl": "/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>/BATCH-06e15fd9/FILE-aef3e7" }
  ]
}

Poll statusUrl for the whole set or a fileUrl for one file. Files complete incrementally, so a finished file is readable while the rest are still running.

Every entry carries fileId, fileUrl, filename, sizeBytes and datasetId in every state — nothing a caller is already reading changes key when a file succeeds. A finished entry adds analysisId, findings and summary.

What a 202 is answered before

The acknowledgement is written once the upload has been read — parsed, decompressed, counted against the limits — and before any document is converted to text. That matters because converting is the slow part: a screenshot or a PDF is transcribed by a vision model, seconds per file.

Caution

Until 2026-09-25 it was not. The sync/async decision was taken after extraction, so Prefer: respond-async held the connection open through every transcription and only then wrote its 202 — measured at 4.46s for two screenshots, and 47.6s for fourteen. The option that exists so a caller need not wait made them wait anyway.

So an async caller is refused on arrival for anything knowable on arrival — an empty body, a truncated multipart, an unsupported encoding, too many files, too many images, a file over the per-file ceiling, a bad dataset key. Those are still a 4xx on the POST.

A file that cannot be READ is reported differently in the two modes, and it has to be: asynchronously the response has already gone.

the upload	Prefer: respond-sync	Prefer: respond-async
one file, unreadable	415 / 422 on the POST	202, then that file’s entry is FAILED with the same code and sentence
several files, one unreadable	200; that entry is FAILED, the rest are analysed	identical, behind the 202

The code and the message are the same either way — only where you read them moves. A fault on our side is never folded into a file’s entry in either mode: it fails the batch, and statusUrl says so.

Naming a dataset

dataset=<key> pins every file in the request — and every later request using the same value — to log-analytics-<workspaceId>-<key>. On a raw body, send X-Dataset instead.

The key is normalised, never rewritten past recognition: lower-cased, with runs of anything outside a-z0-9 becoming a single dash. Nightly Batch and nightly-batch are the same dataset. Two rules keep the result predictable:

• A key longer than maxDatasetKeyLength (64 after normalisation) is 400 INVALID_DATASET. It is not shortened. Truncating it would put two keys that differ only past the limit into one dataset.
• A dataset field and an X-Dataset header naming different destinations is 400 DUPLICATE_FIELD, exactly like the field sent twice with two values. Send one, or send both with the same value.

files[].datasetId on the acknowledgement is always where the events will go, so the destination never has to be inferred.

A file bigger than one request

Every request to this service passes a 100 MiB body ceiling it does not own, and a single-request upload cannot be larger than that however generous the service’s own limits are. Since 25 September 2026 a file that does not fit is uploaded in parts. Each part is its own request, so the ceiling applies to a part and never to the file.

The protocol is identical on both surfaces — only the prefix differs:

Surface	Prefix	Credential
Log analysis	/api/v1/log-analytics/{workspace}/uploads	none; {workspace} is operator-registered
Cortex attachments	/api/v1/attachments/uploads	session JWT

Verb	Path (under the prefix)	What it does
POST	/sessions	Open a session. 201 carries uploadId, partSize, totalParts, expiresAt and the three urls to use next
PUT	/sessions/{id}/parts/{n}	Upload part n. 1-based. Answers the part plus which parts are still missing
GET	/sessions/{id}	Which parts have landed. Cheap, safe to poll — this is the resume call
POST	/sessions/{id}/complete	Assemble and hand off. All-or-nothing
DELETE	/sessions/{id}	Give up and free the disk. Idempotent, so a client may call it blind

Open a session with filename and totalBytes; partSize, sha256, contentType and (log analysis only) dataset are optional.

Discover the door, do not assume it

GET /limits on both surfaces publishes a chunkedUpload block — the path, partBytes to use, maxTotalBytes, the session TTL and the digest header. available: false is a real answer, not an omission: it is how a client is told to use the single-request POST. A deployment that predates this door, or has CHUNKED_UPLOADS_ENABLED=false, must keep working, so a client that hard-codes the path instead of reading it breaks against one.

Retrying a part cannot corrupt the file

A part is addressed by index and overwrites, so the same index may be sent any number of times and the worst a duplicate costs is bandwidth. The dangerous design is an appending one, where a retry the client was unsure about duplicates bytes and shifts everything after it — a corruption that looks like a successful upload.

Two digests, doing different jobs:

• X-Part-Sha256 on a PUT is verified on arrival. A mismatch is 422 PART_DIGEST_MISMATCH and the part is removed, not merely reported — a recorded part is one assembly will trust. Re-send that part alone.
• sha256 at session open covers the whole file, and nothing is accepted unless the assembled bytes match it.

A wrong-sized part is refused at the PUT (400 PART_SIZE_MISMATCH), not at assembly. Parts are fixed-size except the last, which is the remainder; told now a client bug costs one part, told at complete it costs the whole upload.

Log analysis over this door is always asynchronous

The single-request endpoint lets a caller ask to wait (Prefer: respond-sync). This one cannot honour that and does not pretend to: a file large enough to need chunking takes longer to analyse than any proxy in front of this service will hold a connection open, so a synchronous answer here would be a promise kept only for the files that never needed the door. complete returns the same 202, batchId and poll headers the existing async path returns, so a caller already handling that handles this unchanged.

Everything after assembly is the existing pipeline called with the existing arguments — a chunked .gz decompresses exactly as a posted one does, and Word, PDF and screenshots are extracted by the same code. There is no second implementation of any of it.

Stored whole, analysed to a ceiling — and the response says so

analyzableBytes is the most one analysis pass reads. Above it the file is stored in full and the report covers its tail, with the response stating that. It is published because it is the one number a caller would otherwise discover by receiving a report that quietly described part of their file.

The window applies after decoding, never before: tail-slicing a gzip stream produces bytes that are not a gzip stream. It also applies only to a file read as text — a PDF, a .docx and a PNG are containers with their header at the front, so a tail slice of one is not that format, and the caller would get “unsupported format” for a file this endpoint supports.

Two things this door gets right by refusing early

• A dataset name is validated at session open, not at complete. Being told after sending a gigabyte that the destination name was invalid is the worst possible moment to learn it.
• A refusal means the same thing on both doors. The attachment surface translates its three service errors into the protocol’s type, so an over-quota file is 429 here exactly as it is on the single-request POST. Untranslated they arrive as naked 500s, and two doors that disagree about why a file was refused is a worse bug than either answer alone.

Mount order is load-bearing, and the failure looks like a bad id

attachmentsRoutes has a GET /:id and the public log-analytics router has a GET /:batchId. Express matches in declaration order, so mounted first either of them matches the literal segment uploads as an id and answers 404 no such attachment to a perfectly good session request. The chunked prefixes are therefore declared before the routers they extend.

Analyse an index you already have

Most questions in this product are asked about logs that are already stored — they arrived through a collector, an earlier upload, or the ingest shim. Requiring those to be re-uploaded before the analyser could read them was a limit of the transport, not of the analysis. POST /api/v1/log-analyses/dataset removes it.

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses/dataset" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"dataset":"log-analytics-2905","tailHours":24,"limit":2000}'

The response is the same report as a file analysis, and every shaping parameter (?shape=, ?summary=, ?depth=, ?q=) works here too.

Field	Default	Meaning
dataset (or index)	—	The index to analyse. Required. One concrete name.
tailHours	0 (no window)	Analyse only the last N hours. Max 336.
limit	2000	How many records to read. Max 10000.

Nothing is written back. The events came out of an index that already holds them; re-ingesting would duplicate your data and bill you storage for a read. dataset.eventsStored is 0 on this route by design, and the status is still COMPLETED — a read that stores nothing is not a shortfall.

The analysis is stored, though, which is a different thing from the events. An id in a response is a promise it can be read back, so the analysisId resolves on GET /api/v1/log-analyses/{id} — including for an index that held nothing, because that id was handed out too. It reads back only for the workspace that ran it.

The workspace comes from your credential, never from the request. The index name is chosen by the caller, so the name alone can never be trusted. An index that does not belong to the calling workspace is 403 DATASET_FORBIDDEN — it is never answered with an empty report, because “no findings” and “not yours” must never look alike. A wildcard or a comma-separated list is 400 DATASET_INVALID: a pattern cannot be ownership-checked before it expands.

An index that returns no records is a 200 carrying the reason in warnings, not an error — an empty window is an answer. When the read hits its limit, a warning says so, so a capped read is never mistaken for full coverage.

The response

{
  "analysisId": "ANL-8f31ab27",
  "status": "COMPLETED",
  "file": { "name": "application.log", "sizeBytes": 1048576, "format": "text", "eventsParsed": 15234 },
  "dataset": {
    "id": "log-analytics-2905-application-log-8f31ab",
    "eventsStored": 15234,
    "eventsRejected": 0
  },
  "summary": { "eventsAnalyzed": 15234, "threatsDetected": 3, "securityFindings": 7 },
  "findings": [
    {
      "id": "F-1001",
      "type": "THREAT",
      "severity": "HIGH",
      "category": "BRUTE_FORCE",
      "title": "Repeated failed authentication attempts",
      "evidence": {
        "eventCount": 412,
        "firstSeen": "2026-08-27T02:14:09.000Z",
        "samples": ["2026-08-27 02:14:09,001 [http-7] WARN a.AuthFilter - Failed login for admin from 203.0.113.9"]
      },
      "detectedBy": "rules"
    }
  ],
  "warnings": []
}

Field	Meaning
status	COMPLETED, or PARTIAL when the file was larger than one analysis covers
dataset.id	Handle for the retained events — the same handle the application UI lists them under
findings[].type	THREAT, SECURITY, COMPLIANCE, OBSERVABILITY
findings[].severity	CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, INFO — worst first
findings[].evidence.samples	Verbatim log lines, secret-redacted, length-capped, and de-duplicated
findings[].detectedBy	rules for a deterministic detector, model for the AI correlation pass
warnings	Non-fatal degradations: truncation, retention unavailable, AI pass skipped

Every count and timestamp in a finding is measured from the file. The AI pass may only cite evidence the detectors produced, so a finding never carries a number that was not counted — no finding can claim more events than the file holds.

One call, one report

The open route answers a synchronous POST with the whole report — no batch id, nothing to poll:

curl -X POST "https://dev-aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>?wait=true" \
  -F "file=@./Portal_181.log" \
  -F "dataset=prod-app-logs"

There is a dedicated path for it too, which is synchronous by definition:

curl -X POST "https://dev-aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>/analyze" \
  -F "file=@./Portal_181.log"

The response is ordered for reading, and JSON.stringify preserves that order:

status → summary → overview → critical → high → medium → low → info

An empty severity section is omitted, not shipped as [].

{
  "status": "COMPLETED",
  "summary": {
    "headline": "103,720 events over 2026-08-18 14:13 → 2026-08-21 19:06 UTC (3d 4h), 1,767 error-level (1.7%). Worst of 10 findings: CRITICAL — Injection or traversal payload observed in requests.",
    "highlights": [
      "103,720 events analysed, 2026-08-18 14:13 → 2026-08-21 19:06 UTC (3d 4h).",
      "Levels: INFO 50,097 · DEBUG 49,325 · ERROR 1,767.",
      "1,767 error-level events (1.7%).",
      "10 findings — CRITICAL 2, HIGH 3, MEDIUM 5.",
      "CRITICAL: Injection or traversal payload observed in requests (19 events).",
      "Repeats 3,233x (non-error): e.g. [DBG] License heartbeat : 5f3c9a2b-… - Failure"
    ],
    "files": [{ "name": "Portal_181.log", "sizeBytes": 10485792, "eventsParsed": 103720, "dataset": "log-analytics-3103-prod-app-logs" }],
    "timeRange": { "from": "2026-08-18T14:13:22.631Z", "to": "2026-08-21T19:06:58.360Z" },
    "errors": 1767, "errorRate": 0.017,
    "findings": { "total": 10, "bySeverity": { "CRITICAL": 2, "HIGH": 3, "MEDIUM": 5, "LOW": 0, "INFO": 0 },
                  "byType": { "THREAT": 4, "SECURITY": 2, "COMPLIANCE": 1, "OBSERVABILITY": 3 } },
    "topIssues": [ /* the worst three, so a caller has an answer without reading all of them */ ],
    "topPatterns": [ /* recurring shapes, with a REAL example line and its own first/last seen */ ]
  },
  "overview": "…",
  "critical": [ { "id": "F-1001", "severity": "CRITICAL", "events": 19, "evidence": ["…"], "recommendation": "…" } ],
  "high": [ { "id": "F-1004", "evidence": [], "evidenceSameAs": "F-1001" } ]
}

sizeBytes is the upload, and byType counts the whole batch

Two numbers in the batch summary described the wrong thing until 24 September 2026, and both were plausible enough to be believed:

• sizeBytes reported the length of the transcription, not of the file. A batch of ten screenshots of 19–38 KB each answered 301, 217, 244 — which reads as a truncated upload, not as a different quantity. It is the uploaded bytes now, for every file whose content was extracted (image, PDF, Word, Excel, PowerPoint).
• findings.byType was the first file’s tally. total and bySeverity were recomputed across the batch and byType was not, so a ten-image batch reported total: 14 beside byType: {OBSERVABILITY: 1}. byType now sums to total, always.

id is unique per file, not per batch

Finding ids restart at F-1001 for each file, so two files in one batch both publish an F-1001. This is deliberate — the key is fileId + id, and every finding carries its fileId. Do not key a client on id alone for a multi-file response.

What it deliberately does not repeat

Removed	Because
batchId / fileId / fileUrl / statusUrl	there is nothing to come back for
limits (2,012 bytes)	identical on every response, and readable at /limits. Still attached to every rejection
metrics per finding	totalEvents is summary.eventsAnalyzed once per finding; matchedEvents is events renamed; ratio is those two divided
threatsDetected and its three siblings	findings.byType states the same four numbers
repeated evidence	measured on a real 10MB upload, 7 of 10 findings carried samples byte-identical to an earlier finding’s — the rules engine and the model quoting the same lines, ~40% of the findings payload. The later finding keeps its count and bounds and carries evidenceSameAs

Measured on the deployed build: 15.1 KB → 6.0 KB for the same file.

Keeping the batch envelope

?shape=batch returns the previous shape unchanged, so an integration written against files[0].findings has one flag rather than a rewrite:

curl -X POST ".../log-analytics/<your-registered-name>?wait=true&shape=batch" -F "file=@./app.log"

The asynchronous default is untouched: a POST with no wait/Prefer from a non-interactive client still answers 202 with a batch id, and the two GET reads still return the batch and the per-file analysis exactly as before.

The urls are absolute

statusUrl and fileUrl used to come back as bare paths (/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>/BATCH-…), so a caller who copied one out of the response could not use it without already knowing a host the response never told them. They are now absolute, resolved from X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host — this service sits behind Cloudflare and Coolify, where req.protocol is http and the socket host is a container address. With no host header at all the relative path is returned rather than an invented origin: a wrong absolute url is worse, because it looks usable.

Asking for less than the whole report

A caller that wants a narrower body says so. Each parameter can be sent as a query string, a multipart field, or a header (X-Summary, X-Depth), in that precedence — a browser form has nowhere to put a query string, and a curl --data-binary pipe has nowhere to put a field.

Parameter	Values	Effect	Doors
shape	report, findings, batch	findings returns the findings alone; batch is the pre-September envelope	both
summary	none, brief (default), full, digest	Chooses the WORDING of overview. brief is the counted bullets — health, level breakdown, main failure, busiest hour, one action. full is the plain-English explanation: what each finding is, how big it is against the window, the wall-clock window of a burst, one real log line with its file line number, and what to do — held to 1,000 words, and it returns the overview and nothing else. digest is the per-category blocks. none drops the key	both
depth	titles, standard (default), full	titles drops evidence and recommendations; full keeps everything	both
q	free text	The view is read from the question	keyed only
narrow	true (default), false	false reads the question but does not act on it — see below	keyed only

full and brief swapped in September 2026

full used to return execSummary’s counted bullets. Measured on one real file, ?summary=full came back 762 bytes and ?summary=brief came back 10,089 — because full means “the overview and nothing else”, so it returned the least of the three levels, and what it returned was a bullet list. Reported from Postman:

Why it not gives the exact plain english explaintion to the API which we except like gemeni, deepseek, etc. other AI chat models? It should give that in response, correct for summary=full and this response should be there on the summary=bried

So the two swapped. The bullets are the short form and are at brief, which is still the default, so no existing integration changes shape — only the wording of overview at the explicitly-requested full. digest is untouched.

A browser is floored at brief whatever the question resolves to, because the application renders its own explanation in the closing Summary with the log lines folded into a collapsible card; serving the API explanation as the lead as well would print the same reading twice.

The application’s chat composer sends depth=full, because that surface is read by a person rather than parsed by a program.

An unrecognised value is 400 BAD_PARAM naming what was accepted, never a silent fallback to the default — a caller that misspells a parameter must not be told its request worked. tailHours=1e9 is rejected rather than clamped for the same reason: analysing the whole file because the number was silly is a different answer from the one asked for.

q is the one a chat surface uses: “just the findings” resolves to the findings view, “give me a summary” to the overview, “in-depth, critical only” to the whole report narrowed to critical. A question it cannot classify returns the default view rather than guessing.

A severity filter says what it removed

Narrowing to one severity deletes the other sections, and an empty result then reads exactly like a healthy system — to the one caller who asked about critical issues. So the narrowing reports itself in warnings[]:

Showing critical findings only. This analysis also found 4 high, 3 medium — ask
again without a severity in the question to see them.

“No critical findings” and “nothing wrong” are different answers, and the response has to be able to tell them apart.

The severity words a question can use

Section	Words that resolve to it
critical	critical, crit, blocker
high	high, severe, major
medium	medium, moderate
low	low, minor
info	info, informational, note

info used to resolve to low, from when INFO was not a section of its own. It is one now — and it is where a healthy file keeps its only finding — so “show me the info findings” was narrowing to a different set of findings and presenting them as the ones asked for.

A filter that matches nothing does not apply

any critical insights? asked of a file whose only finding is an INFO note used to return a report with no findings in it at all: the question was answered by deleting the answer. A severity in a question is a request to lead with that severity, not an instruction to discard the analysis when none of it matches.

So the filter narrows where narrowing leaves something, and steps aside where it would leave nothing. The body then carries every section, view.severities is [] because no narrowing happened, and warnings[] says which question was answered:

No critical findings were raised. Showing everything this analysis did find
instead — 1 info.

A file that genuinely has critical findings is unaffected: the filter applies, the other sections are dropped, and the first note above is the one you get.

Reading the question without acting on it — narrow=false

Stepping aside when a filter matches nothing fixes the empty report, but it leaves the filter in charge whenever it matches something: ask any critical insights? of a file with one critical and forty other findings and forty are withheld. For a surface that is read rather than parsed, that is the wrong default — the reader asked what is critical, not to be shown less.

narrow=false keeps the whole body and reports the question separately, so the severity decides what to put first, not what to withhold:

"view": {
  "sections": ["overview", "summary", "findings"],
  "severities": [],
  "asked": ["critical"],
  "source": "keywords"
}

asked is what the question NAMED. severities is what was actually removed on the strength of it. They are different facts and were the same field: with the filter suppressed, severities is always [], and a surface that read it to say “showing critical” would have had nothing to read.

The application’s chat composer sends narrow=false on every call. A program that wants the filter simply omits the parameter — the default is unchanged, so nothing that integrates today behaves differently.

Synchronous by default, a batch past the ceilings

Both routes answer on the connection — 200 with the report — unless the upload passes one of two ceilings, in which case they answer 202 with a batchId and a statusUrl to poll. How this default came about is in the history.

The two ceilings

Upload	Answer
≤ syncMaxBytes (16MB) and ≤ syncMaxImages (10)	200 with the report
past either	202 with a batchId and a statusUrl

Both are published on GET …/limits and both are env-tunable (LOG_ANALYSIS_SYNC_MAX_BYTES, LOG_ANALYSIS_SYNC_MAX_IMAGES). Neither is a refusal — the analysis runs either way; they only decide where the caller reads the result.

Keeping the old contract

One header. Prefer: respond-async (or ?wait=false) returns the batchId however small the upload — the V1 contract byte for byte. Prefer: respond-sync / ?wait=true waits however large it is, and ?shape=batch keeps the envelope shape. An explicit choice wins in both directions, and Prefer outranks ?wait.

The per-turn index ceiling (C2)

GET /api/v1/log-analyses/limits also publishes limits.maxIndexesPerTurn (default 8, LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_INDEXES_PER_TURN) and limits.turnsPerMin (default 10, LOG_ANALYSIS_TURNS_PER_MIN). POST /dataset takes one index per request — the fan-out over several indexes is the client’s job — and the route’s own rate budget is the product of those two.

🔴 AND THE PRODUCT WAS NOT THE BUDGET. The route asked for createRateLimit(turnsPerMin × maxIndexesPerTurn), and createRateLimit clamps to config.rateLimitPerMin — default 60. So /limits published 10 × 8 = 80 and the limiter enforced 60: seven and a half turns. A client doing exactly what /limits told it to do was refused part-way through its eighth question, and the answer came back with the report half missing — which is C2’s own symptom, produced by C2’s own fix. Publishing the ceiling removed the mirrored constant and left an unapplied one, and the second is harder to see: the caller is no longer guessing, it has been told a number and refused on it.

The route now uses createBurstRateLimit, whose whole reason for existing is a bucket where one logical operation is legitimately many requests — a reader turn fanned out over N indexes, the same shape as a chunked upload’s 64 PUTs. It is unclamped by design, on its own bucket, and every call stays bounded by its own sync and byte budgets. datasetTurnBudget() derives all three numbers in one place and limits.datasetRequestsPerMin publishes the budget that is actually enforced, so a client can check the arithmetic instead of trusting it.

⚠️ The unit test could not see this. It imported the constants and asserted the product, which is true whichever limiter the route is wired to. tests/api/datasetTurnBudgetEnforced.test.ts spends the whole published budget through the real mounted app; against the clamped helper it fails at “turn 8, index 5”.

⚠️ That product is why the number is published rather than copied. The browser composer held its own MAX_FALLBACK_TARGETS, bound to the server’s copy by nothing but a comment in another repository. Raise the client cap alone — the obvious fix for “only 4 of my 7 indexes were analysed” — and the budget is unchanged, so the cost per turn doubles against a fixed ceiling and 10 turns a minute quietly becomes 5. The symptom gets strictly worse while looking like a fix.

⚠️ The fields are nested under limits, not at the top level. The first client to read them read the top level, got undefined on every successful response, and fell back to its hard-coded default — a fetch that succeeds and yields nothing usable is indistinguishable at the call site from one that failed. A client that cannot read them must degrade to its own default, never to an unbounded fan-out.

Images are counted separately from bytes, and that is the load-bearing part. Ten screenshots are a few MB and ten vision calls: trivially under any byte ceiling and the slowest thing this endpoint does. A byte figure structurally cannot see that request. countImages() is shared with the TOO_MANY_IMAGES refusal so the two cannot disagree about what an image is the first time the sniffer learns a format.

The byte ceiling is measured, and a 200 does not prove a size is safe

The edge in front of this service cuts a request at ~100s, and a 524 loses the batchId as well as the findings — strictly worse than the 202 it replaced. Measured through Cloudflare against dev on 25 September 2026, one file per request:

Size	Result	Wall	Server
1MB	200	11.8s	6.9s	clean
4MB	200	20.0s	15.0s	clean
8MB	200	40.9s	31.8s	clean
16MB	200	76.3 / 79.0 / 79.4 / 87.0s	55–67s	clean ×4
24MB	200	100.6s	80.3s	degraded

~4.8s/MB wall on top of ~7s fixed. 16MB was sampled four times — one sample is not a ceiling, and an 8MB call measured 40.9s once and 62.3s another time, which is what prompted re-running it. The four 16MB runs land at 76–87s with no degradation, so the worst observed leaves ~13s under the cut. That is thin but real; if partners start seeing 524s, drop LOG_ANALYSIS_SYNC_MAX_BYTES to 8MB — one env var, no deploy.

24MB is already past the edge and only answered because LOG_ANALYSIS_SYNC_BUDGET_MS capped the server at 80s and stopped storing events — it warned that 3,673 of 301,673 were analysed but not retained. So a 200 at some size is not evidence that size is safe: whether the next caller lands before or after the cut depends on their link speed, not on anything here.

16MB is the last size that answers complete and with margin — and it is exactly what the old INTERACTIVE_SYNC_MAX_BYTES held. That number was always right; the caller.interactive term ANDed beside it was the defect. Re-run the ladder before raising LOG_ANALYSIS_SYNC_MAX_BYTES.

Likely trigger: the warnings that came first (2026-10-07)

A failing log is often explained by what it said before it failed. Every analysis now looks for one such precursor (findPrecursor in rootCause.ts):

• The failure is the largest error-level shape — the error-or-worse cluster with the most events.
• A candidate is a warning/activity shape (lines grouped by template, so thread or host variants count together) that is at least half WARN, and whose first line is at or before the first line of that failure and no more than 10 minutes earlier.
• It must be big enough to matter: a count ≥ 2× the file’s error count, or ≥ 25 % of the file’s WARN lines — and, since ai-service 8654ef4, at least 5 lines.
• It must still be running when the failure starts: its last line no more than 10 s before the failure’s first. Before, three login failed warnings that had ended 53 s earlier (and had already caused their own lockout) were named the trigger of two MySQL server has gone away errors in another subsystem — 3 of 3 WARN lines clears the 25 % test on a 10-line file.
• The earliest candidate wins; on a tie in first-seen time, the larger count.

Other rule fixes from the same upload (ai-service 8654ef4)

• ELEVATED_ERROR_RATE names the top ERROR-level shape. The ranked failure list also holds lines that only read as failures (login failed at WARN), and the finding titled “30% of events failed, most often: <a WARN line>” with WARN samples as its evidence.
• SSNs are their own finding: detector government_id, category GOVERNMENT_ID_EXPOSURE, COMPLIANCE, HIGH, from a single line (\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4} or ssn=/social security number: followed by a digit; ssn=[REDACTED] and 3-3-4 phone numbers are not hits). It used to be one arm of sensitive_data, whose floor of 3 counts emails too, so one SSN beside one email raised nothing and the model filed the SSN under “personal data in authentication logs” at MEDIUM. sensitive_data keeps cards, DOB and emails.
• MySQL server has gone away / lost connection to … server match dependency_failure.
• A lockout is a finding on its own (detector account_lockout, THREAT / BRUTE_FORCE / HIGH, one line: account locked, locked out, too many failed attempts; unlocks and lockout policy … settings excluded). Three failed logins and a lockout stayed under auth_failure’s floor of 5, so the lockout appeared only when the model pass answered — on a re-test where it returned no JSON, not at all. Same key as auth_failure, so they merge.
• Model categories: a finding saying two incidents are separate or unrelated maps to CORRELATED_ACTIVITY (it was BRUTE_FORCE, on the word “lockout”); SSN wording maps to GOVERNMENT_ID_EXPOSURE, so it dedupes with the rule finding. Since ai-service 8424767 the separate-incident wording is read before the model’s own category is trusted (the model itself wrote BRUTE_FORCE on “multiple independent failure modes”).
• Dedupe at equal severity keeps the rule finding (8424767). The merged list is sorted by severity, type, then count, and the first finding per type:category wins — so a model restatement that counted more lines (an email and an SSN, count 2) displaced the one-line SSN rule finding. A model finding now holds a key over a rule only when strictly more severe.

A precursor produces three things:

where	what
headline	opens the summary: Likely trigger: … (N warnings from HH:MM:SS UTC), followed by … (M errors from HH:MM:SS UTC).
finding	category: "LIKELY_TRIGGER", type: "OBSERVABILITY", detectedBy: "rules"; severity HIGH when the failure has ≥ 100 events, else MEDIUM. evidence carries eventCount, firstSeen, lastSeen and up to 3 samples; metrics adds warningEvents, followingErrorEvents and leadSeconds
evidence pack	the model pass sees a trigger:0 row (likely trigger (starts before the main failure): …) plus the top 3 warning/activity shapes, even when the file is failing

Before this, warning shapes reached the model only when nothing failed, so the model saw the errors and blamed their own subject. On the Loghub Hadoop_2k.log sample (level census INFO 1040, WARN 808, ERROR 150, FATAL 2) the trigger is 476 WARN Client: Address change detected … msra-sa-41 lines from 18:05:27, followed by 147 RMContainerAllocator: ERROR IN CONTACTING RM. from 18:06:01 — the address change is the cause, the RM errors its consequence.

Error counts use the log’s own level words

The headline’s error clause counts error-or-worse lines (ERROR, ERR, FATAL, CRITICAL, SEVERE) and breaks them down in the words the file used, largest first: 152 errors (150 ERROR, 2 FATAL; 7.6%). A level the file never wrote never appears — an earlier build printed 152 SEVERE for that Hadoop log, which contains no SEVERE line.

Same file, same analysis (2026-10-07)

Uploading the same bytes twice used to create another dataset copy and run the model pass again — which is not repeatable, so the same 22-line file came back with 4 findings, then 3. On the multipart upload routes (POST /api/v1/log-analytics/{name} and its /analyze form) a file is now answered from the stored analysis when all of these hold:

• same workspace and same contentSha256 (SHA-256 of the file bytes);
• the stored analysis was made under the current ANALYSIS_VERSION (2026-10-07.1; a release that changes what an analysis says bumps it);
• it is still within retention, finished COMPLETED, and is not partial;
• the request asks for the plain analysis of the whole file — no time window, no tail, no dataset= key (those requests are analysed fresh, and their results are never reused).

That file’s entry then has status: "reused", the existing analysisId and datasetId, the same findings, and reusedFrom: { analysisId, createdAt }. No index is written and no model call is made. The entry keeps the filename of this upload. The single-file POST /api/v1/log-analyses route records its uploads (so they are listed and deletable, below) but always analyses.

A file attached in Cortex chat follows the same rule (ai-service c8b13f8, prod re-test P-3). Before writing events, the attachment hashes its bytes and reuses a live dataset this workspace already holds for them, with no new index; two identical attachments in flight share one write. When it does write a dataset it leaves a record listed by GET /api/v1/log-analyses as {id: <attachmentId>, datasetId, fileName, bytes, findings: null, status: "RETAINED"} — deletable with DELETE /api/v1/log-analyses/<attachmentId> (index, register entries and record), and reused by a later identical upload, which is analysed into that dataset without a copy. Before this, every attachment wrote a new index that no list showed.

To analyse it again anyway, send the multipart field force=true (or header x-force: true):

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>" \
  -F "file=@./app.log" -F "force=true"

Two more changes make a fresh analysis steadier: the model pass answers through a strict json_schema response format, and rule and model findings are sorted before they are de-duplicated, so the same inputs keep the same survivor. The model pass’s findings are also kept in the Redis cortex:logfindings cache (24 h), so the same evidence replays the same model findings (see AI models).

partial: true — rule findings only

When the model pass is skipped — its time budget was spent on the file, the call failed, or no model is configured — the analysis carries partial: true with the deterministic findings alone and the reason in warnings. A partial analysis is never reused: the next identical upload is analysed again. The Sandbox labels it “AI review skipped (timed out); rule findings only”.

Limits and errors

Every limit is published, enforced, and named in the rejection. Read the live numbers rather than trusting this page:

curl "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses/limits" -H "Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>"
curl "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>/limits"     # no credential

Both return maxFilesPerRequest, maxBytesPerFile, maxBytesPerRequest, maxEventsPerFile, maxRequestsPerMinute, maxConcurrentAnalyses, maxConcurrentBytes, resultRetentionHours, maxFieldsPerEvent, acceptedFormats, extractedFormats, maxImagesPerRequest, acceptedEncodings and the dataset-naming settings. acceptedFormats and extractedFormats are separate on purpose — see Word, Excel, PowerPoint, PDF and screenshots. The rate limit reported is the EFFECTIVE one, after the service-wide cap. The same object is attached to every success and every 4xx of the route the request was made on — the two routes do not have the same ceilings.

Status	Code	When
400	EMPTY_BODY	No body at all
400	NO_FILE / EMPTY_FILE	No file part, or one with no bytes
400	INCOMPLETE_UPLOAD	The multipart body ended before its closing boundary
400	INVALID_FILENAME	X-Filename is not valid percent-encoding
400	INVALID_DATASET	A dataset key that cannot become a name, or one over the length limit
413	TOO_MANY_IMAGES	More images than maxImagesPerRequest; each is a vision call
415	UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT	A format that cannot be read — the message names what it actually is
422	NO_TEXT_EXTRACTED	The format was understood but held no text (empty document, scanned PDF)
400	DUPLICATE_FIELD	A field sent twice with different values — a form field and its X- header count as the same field
400	CORRUPT_ARCHIVE	Gzipped, but it would not decompress
400	INVALID_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY	Outside [A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}
401	—	Missing, unknown or expired credential (keyed route only)
403	NO_WORKSPACE / IP_NOT_ALLOWED	Credential not bound to a workspace; caller address not registered
404	NOT_FOUND	Unknown or expired id, an unregistered workspace segment, or another tenant’s id
409	IDEMPOTENT_REQUEST_IN_FLIGHT	Your own retry overtook your first request
422	IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED	That key was already used for a different upload. Nothing was analysed
413	FILE_TOO_LARGE / BATCH_TOO_LARGE / TOO_MANY_FILES	Over a published ceiling
415	UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT	An archive format this endpoint does not read
429	RATE_LIMITED	Over maxRequestsPerMinute; carries Retry-After
503	ANALYSIS_CAPACITY	At the concurrency ceiling. Nothing was accepted — send the same upload again. Carries Retry-After

Nothing a caller can put in a request produces a 5xx. A 500 means we broke.

A file above maxEventsPerFile is analysed up to that point and the response says so in status (PARTIAL) and warnings — it never reports on a prefix silently.

A fault in one file does not fail the batch

A breach is charged to the thing that caused it. A breach of the request refuses the whole call; a fault in one file fails that file and the rest are still analysed.

Breach	Scope	Result
NO_FILE, TOO_MANY_FILES, BATCH_TOO_LARGE	the request	Nothing is accepted — no batchId, nothing analysed
EMPTY_FILE, FILE_TOO_LARGE, UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT, UPLOAD_NOT_BINARY	one file	That file is dropped and named; the others are analysed. The call still answers 200

With one file the two are the same thing. A single-file upload that breaches a per-file limit is still refused outright with its usual 400 / 413 / 415, because there is nothing left to answer with — every existing single-file contract is unchanged.

Where the dropped file shows up depends on the shape, and this is the part to write your client against — a per-file fault never changes the HTTP status, so a caller that only checks the status code will not notice one:

Shape	status	Where the failed file appears
?shape=batch	PARTIAL	Its own entry in files[], status: "FAILED", with error.code and error.message
default (the report)	COMPLETED	warnings only — "zero.png was not analysed. \"zero.png\" is empty…". The report’s summary.files[] lists the files that were analysed

On the batch shape you always get one entry per file you sent. A batch that returned three results for four uploads would be the answer nobody downstream retries; four entries, one of them FAILED with a reason, is one you can act on. On the report shape there is no per-file status to carry, so the sentence in warnings is the whole record of it — read warnings, not just status.

Note

Before 2026-09-24 a single 0-byte or oversize file anywhere in a batch answered 400 EMPTY_FILE / 413 FILE_TOO_LARGE and analysed none of the good files beside it. Unreadable files were already handled this way; the two per-file limits were the last checks running ahead of the batch instead of inside it.

Pacing a poller

429 and 503 both carry Retry-After in seconds alongside retryAfterSeconds in the body, and the two always agree. A 202 — from the POST and from every read after it — carries Retry-After, X-Poll-After-Ms, and pollAfterMs in the body. Use them; the interval is estimated from the size of what you actually sent.

Every response also carries X-Request-Id. Send your own and it is echoed, so one id spans both sides of a failure report.

Retrying safely

Send Idempotency-Key on any POST. A second request carrying the same key within the retention window returns the original response — the same id, byte for byte — instead of starting a second analysis. Keys are scoped per workspace, because two partners will both pick 1.

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>" \
  -H "Idempotency-Key: nightly-2026-08-28" -F "file=@./app.log"

A key belongs to one upload. Sending the same key with a different file — or a different filename, or a different dataset — is 422 IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED, and nothing is analysed. Use a new key for a new upload; reuse one only to retry the identical request.

The check is on the files themselves, not on the raw request bytes. A multipart body carries a randomly generated boundary, so hashing the bytes would refuse every legitimate retry — re-sending the same file with a fresh boundary is still recognised as the retry it is.

Behind more than one replica

Reservations and async results are shared through OpenSearch, so a retry or a poll that lands on a different replica than the one that took the original request is answered from that request’s record rather than starting a second analysis or 404ing a live id. The claim is atomic in the store, so two simultaneous requests carrying one key cannot both begin — the loser is told 409 IDEMPOTENT_REQUEST_IN_FLIGHT, which it can retry.

If the shared store is unreachable the endpoint keeps answering with per-process state. The cost is cross-replica agreement, never a wrong answer: an outage in bookkeeping must not fail an upload.

When the connection drops before an answer

A client-side ECONNRESET — Postman renders it “Could not send request — Error: read ECONNRESET” — is a TCP reset, not an HTTP status. It carries no body and no code, so it looks identical whether the endpoint refused the upload, the edge dropped it, or the network between you and Cloudflare broke. It is not a rejection from this API: every refusal this endpoint makes arrives as a status with a named code.

Two things make an upload survive it:

1. Do not hold the connection open for work you can poll for. Screenshots and PDFs are transcribed before the analysis starts, so a Prefer: respond-sync call is held for as long as that takes — seconds per image. Prefer: respond-async returns a 202 with a statusUrl; poll that instead.
2. Send an Idempotency-Key. After a reset you cannot tell whether the request arrived, so a blind retry risks a second analysis and a second dataset. With a key, the retry returns the original answer if the first one landed and starts the work if it did not — see Retrying safely above.

Caution

Do not read a reset as a property of your payload. Measured against dev on 2026-09-25: the same two-image upload that a client reported as failing returned 200 on 26 of 26 attempts from curl and from a Node client sending Postman’s own headers over a reused keep-alive socket — while the service’s log showed no arrival line for the reported failure, which is written the moment a request’s headers are parsed. The request had never reached the origin. A reset that alternates between clients, or between one file and two, is a transport fault; a defect in this API would reproduce on both.

Note

A 524 is a different failure and has a different cause: the edge waited for the origin and gave up. It arrives as a real status with a body. Measured at 128.1s against the dev tunnel — so a long upload can reach it — whereas a reset has no duration you can rely on at all.

Log formats it reads

Logrite instruments 28 languages, each through that language’s normal logging library, and every one of those has its own default line format. The parser is measured against all of them — scripts/log-analysis-language-corpus.js, 35 formats in each library’s documented default layout, pinned as a test so a 29th language cannot be added to the platform without it failing.

Structured records (JSON, NDJSON, CSV) are read field-by-field. Plain text is read by dialect. In both cases no line is ever dropped: a line the parser cannot date or classify is still stored with its text, because it is still evidence.

What "readable" means here

A retained line with no @timestamp is findable by no time window, and one with no level is findable by no severity filter. Both are stored and neither raises an error, so this is what the corpus measures — not whether lines survive, but whether they can be found afterwards.

Written by	Read
logback, log4j2, slf4j (Java, Kotlin, Scala, Groovy)	timestamp, thread, level, logger
Python logging, loguru	timestamp, level
winston, pino, bunyan (JS, TS, Vue, Svelte)	timestamp, level — including pino’s numeric levels
Serilog console and compact/CLEF, NLog, Microsoft.Extensions.Logging (C#, VB.NET, F#)	timestamp, level — CLEF’s @t / @l / @mt
logrus, zap, zerolog, slog (Go)	timestamp, level, in both text and JSON
env_logger, tracing (Rust)	timestamp, level, target
Monolog (PHP), Timber/logcat (Kotlin), spdlog (C++), package:logging (Dart)	timestamp, level
std.log (Zig), NSLog (Objective-C), os.Logger (Swift), Log4perl, futile.logger (R), LuaLogging, Elixir Logger, syslog	whatever the format carries

Also read: RFC 5424 and RFC 3164 syslog, Common Log Format (nginx, Apache), logfmt, epoch seconds and milliseconds, and sub-second precision from three to nine digits.

Severity

A severity written in uppercase is read from anywhere in the line. Any other casing is read only next to a delimiter that marks it as a field — [error], level=error, E/Tag:. This is deliberate: error is an ordinary English word, and an INFO line reading “no error occurred” must not be stored as an ERROR.

Numeric levels are matched exactly against pino’s 10–60 scale. A number off that scale is not given a severity — syslog’s severities run 0–7, nothing in a record says which convention is in use, and guessing produces a severity nobody wrote.

Records that carry a time but no date

log4j2’s stock pattern, Serilog’s console sink and Elixir’s Logger all write a time and no date. Those events take their day from the nearest dated line in the same file, and only failing that from the date the file was received. When that happens the events carry timestampInferred: true and the response warnings say where the day came from.

Five formats carry no timestamp or no level in the line at all

F# via Microsoft.Extensions.Logging and Zig’s std.log write no time; os.Logger, NSLog and a priority-less syslog line write no severity. Those fields stay empty rather than being filled in. If you need them, configure the logger to emit them: TimestampFormat for the .NET console provider, <PRI> for syslog.

A stack trace is one event

A line that does not open a log entry belongs to the entry above it. Read line-by-line, a .NET exception log reports one event per stack frame — which inflates the total, deflates the error rate, and leaves every frame undated and levelless, findable by no time window and no severity filter.

Measured against a real customer estate — 311 files, 532 MB, 12 services:

	line-by-line	folded
events carrying a timestamp	71.6%	100.0%
events carrying a level	71.6%	100.0%
exception_*.log events	81,596	1,526
…and its reported error rate	1.9%	98.9%

The fold is never silent — it is named in warnings with both numbers:

exception_2026-02-02.log: 56,917 of 58,007 lines were continuation lines — stack frames and wrapped messages belonging to the entry above them — and were folded into it. The file holds 1,090 log entries.

Bounds, because both directions of getting this wrong are real. A file where nothing opens an entry is returned untouched — five of the 28 supported formats carry no timestamp and no level in the line, and folding those would produce one event holding the whole file. An entry stops absorbing after 200 lines and the overflow continues as ordinary events, so a misread format cannot swallow a file and nothing is dropped either way.

Prose quotes the file, not a placeholder

Repeated failures are clustered by masking the varying parts of a line. That key is the right thing to group on and the wrong thing to print, and it was being printed:

Most repeated failures: <ts> -<n>:<n> [DBG] License heartbeat : <uuid> - Failure (x3,233)

The leading -<n>:<n> is not even a masked quantity — it is the timezone offset -05:00. And that line is [DBG]: a debug line was leading the report as the estate’s top failure. Now:

Most repeated errors (e.g.): [ERR] Unhandled exception. System.NullReferenceException at Portal.Api.Handler (x210)

A real line from the file, labelled e.g. — a cluster of 3,233 covers 3,233 different ids, and quoting one without that word claims one id failed 3,233 times. Error-level shapes sort first; anything else is named for what it is.

Word, Excel, PowerPoint, PDF and screenshots

Since 23 September 2026 these endpoints read the same formats Cortex chat does. People send an Excel export of a query log, a PDF incident report, or a screenshot of a stack trace — so the text is extracted first and the analysis runs on that.

curl -X POST "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<workspace>?summary=full" \
  -H "Prefer: respond-sync" \
  -F "file=@./incident-report.pdf" \
  -F "file=@./query-timings.xlsx" \
  -F "file=@./error-screenshot.png"

Nothing changes for an ordinary log. text, json, ndjson, csv and source files are passed to the parser byte for byte, exactly as before.

You send	What happens	files[].source.format
.log .txt .json .ndjson .csv + code	read directly, untouched	(absent)
.docx	paragraph text from the OOXML body	Word document
.xlsx	every sheet as TSV, shared strings resolved	Excel workbook
.pptx	slide text plus speaker notes	PowerPoint deck
.pdf	the text layer	PDF
.png .jpg .jpeg .gif .webp .bmp .heic .tiff .avif	transcribed by a vision model	image
.doc .xls .ppt (pre-2007)	415 — re-save as the modern format	—
.zip .7z .rar, executables, SQLite	415, naming what it is	—

The format is decided by the bytes, never the extension or the Content-Type you send — a .docx renamed .log is still read as Word.

A converted file says so, and you should read it

Every file whose text was extracted carries a source object on its entry, from the acknowledgement onward — not only once it finishes:

{
  "fileId": "FILE-…",
  "filename": "error-screenshot.png",
  "source": { "format": "image", "notice": "Transcribed by deepseek-v4.1-flash." }
}

A finding whose “events” were transcribed out of a picture is weaker evidence than one read from the log file, and there is no way to tell from the finding alone. An ordinary log has no source at all, so the field’s presence is the signal.

Images are capped separately, and lower

Each image is a vision-model call, so maxImagesPerRequest (default 20) is far below the 1000-file limit. Going over is refused with 413 TOO_MANY_IMAGES — never quietly trimmed to the first 20.

How long several images take, and the ceiling that is not ours

Images are transcribed concurrently, four at a time, and a batch in which every file is under a megabyte is also analysed four at a time. Both bounds are deliberate: the provider meters 10 concurrent calls in aggregate and 5 per model across every caller, and a batch holding any file over a megabyte still runs strictly one at a time, because a large log holds its whole parsed event list in memory while it is analysed.

Measured through Cloudflare against dev on 24 September 2026, before and after:

images in one request	serial	concurrent
1	22.8s	10.7s
2	19.9s	—
4	40.0s	—
6	—	—
10	106.0s	see below

A synchronous upload has a ceiling that belongs to the edge, not to us

Forced synchronous with 14 images, the request was cut by Cloudflare at 128.1 seconds with its own 524 page — server: cloudflare, a 16-byte body, no JSON from us. Ten images at ~106s returned 200 on three consecutive runs, so the ceiling sits between those two and we have not bisected it further. Treat anything approaching two minutes of synchronous work as unsafe.

When this happens the analysis is not lost — it completes, is stored, and is readable at the batch’s statusUrl. Nothing on our side reports an error, because from here the request succeeded; the only witness is the caller’s timeout page. If a large synchronous upload returns an edge error rather than JSON, poll the batch rather than resending it.

A second consequence of serial work is quieter. The synchronous time budget (80s) starts when the request arrives, and transcription spends it before the analysis begins — so on a large image set the model pass is skipped for the later files and the report says so in warnings: “AI correlation was skipped: this analysis used its time budget on the file itself.” Findings are still returned; they are the deterministic ones only.

A large image is re-encoded to fit, not refused for its size

An image over the byte budget a vision model is sent is re-encoded until it fits — JPEG first, then progressively smaller on the long edge — and the response says what was done. Nothing is refused for its size unless three attempts have already failed.

Measured on dev, 24 September 2026: one macOS screenshot, saved five ways.

file	size	before	now
shot.gif	303 KB	read	read
shot.heic	254 KB	read	read
shot.jpg	653 KB	read	read
shot.bmp	30 MB	refused	read
shot.tiff	30 MB	refused	read

⚠ BMP was advertised and had never once been decoded — the same trap, one layer down. bmp is in extractedFormats, the sniffer maps 42 4d to image/bmp, and there is a human name ready for it, but libvips ships no BMP loader in the prebuilt binary: sharp(bmp) answers “Input buffer contains unsupported image format”. The size refusal was hiding it, and hiding it plausibly — BMP is uncompressed, so a BMP really is enormous, and the file really was over the limit. It would have failed at any size. It is now decoded directly (BI_RGB and BI_BITFIELDS at 24 and 32bpp), and the raw pixels go through the same encoder as everything else.

One picture, opposite outcomes, decided by a container format the sender did not choose deliberately: BMP and TIFF store pixels uncompressed, so the same screen is forty times the size. The refusal then asked them to “attach a smaller version or a cropped screenshot” — the one job the service is better placed to do itself.

⚠ The gate was in the wrong place, which is what made it unfixable by tuning the number. It ran before normalisation, so it measured the file as sent rather than the bytes that reach the model — and normalising a 30 MB BMP produces a PNG of a few hundred kilobytes. Raising the limit to 10 MB would have moved the boundary and kept the bug.

Resolution is spent only after fidelity, in that order, because the job is reading text off a screenshot. Halving the long edge halves the height of every glyph and is what actually loses a log line; JPEG at quality 80 leaves text crisply legible at a fraction of the size. So a budget that plain re-encoding can meet costs no pixels at all.

The sizes are measured, not calculated: bytes after encoding cannot be predicted from pixel count — a screenshot of dense text and a photograph of the same dimensions differ by an order of magnitude, and PNG’s advantage on flat UI colour reverses on photographic noise. The ladder encodes, looks, and steps down only if it must.

Which model reads the picture (updated 2026-10-07)

Since 2026-10-07 the image transcription and the findings pass both run on one pinned model. There is no fallback model: a failed call is retried on the same model, then sent to the same model on the provider’s discounted flex lane. A cross-model ladder could answer the same upload differently depending on which rung was up — and, as measured below, a model that cannot see replaces a refusal with fabrication. See AI models for the pinned model and the lanes.

The measurements below are what led there; the multi-model ladder they describe is retired.

Every model id the provider serves was probed with one image of known content on 24 September 2026. 16 of 22 transcribed it perfectly; 6 could not see it — and not one of the 6 returned an error. Five said so in prose (“I don’t see any image attached”), which the ladder treats as a failed rung and climbs past. The sixth returned five invented lines of plausible monospace text. Capability is also not inferable from the family name: one glm-5.3-flash sees, plain glm-5.3 does not.

A model that cannot see an image answers 200, not an error

This is why the vision ladder judges the answer rather than the HTTP status, and why only ids on the measured-capable list may be configured as rungs.

Ranked over 14 images × 3 repetitions each, scored against ground truth taken from each image’s own source rather than from another model’s reading:

vision model	recall	precision	perfect runs	run-to-run consistency
gemma-4-31b	97.7%	98.8%	36 of 42	92.9%
glm-5.3-flash	96.5%	98.4%	37 of 42	71.4%
deepseek-v4.1-flash	97.7%	89.8%	26 of 42	50.0%

All three recover the line that names the failure 100% of the time, so none of them loses the diagnosis. They differ in what they add: the lowest-precision model returned 17 lines for an 11-line screenshot and 7 for a 5-line one, and an invented line becomes an evidence row indistinguishable from a transcribed one.

The instability is an interaction with this service’s own transcription prompt, not a property of the model — under a bare “transcribe this” prompt the same model reaches 99.2% precision. A ranking measured against one prompt does not transfer to another.

A reasoning model needs room to think AND to answer

The findings pass is capped at LOG_ANALYSIS_FINDINGS_MAX_TOKENS (4000). That number is not arbitrary and the previous one — a hard-coded 1500 — caused a measured regression worth stating plainly.

Some models on this provider emit reasoning_content before writing any answer. Measured on a single seven-row evidence table, two repetitions each:

model	completion tokens	reasoning_content
gemma-4-31b	87–96	none
deepseek-v4-flash	161–172	none
deepseek-v4.1-flash	590–1,351	1,741–5,100 characters

On a larger evidence table the reasoning crosses the ceiling and the answer is truncated, so the completion arrives empty.

An empty completion is reported as “nothing needs attention”

Making a reasoning model the analysis model under the old 1500-token cap took a 14-image corpus from 88.1% to 26.2% correct — and not by answering wrongly. Every transcription stayed perfect and run-to-run consistency actually rose. The reports were confident all-clears: “No issue cleared a finding threshold” over a screenshot of an expired certificate. A token limit rendered as a clean bill of health.

If you change LLM_MODEL, check whether the model emits reasoning tokens and raise this ceiling to suit. The service logs model pass raised nothing: … (completion 0 chars, N evidence rows) when it happens; without that line the symptom is invisible.

⚠ A benchmark must make the call this service makes. The model that caused this had been ranked at 100% correct — by a harness that sent no output ceiling, and so measured a request the service never issues. The same caution applies to the vision ranking above and its prompt.

A format we understand but cannot read is refused

An empty document, or a scanned PDF with no text layer, comes back 422 NO_TEXT_EXTRACTED naming the file. It is not analysed as zero events and reported COMPLETED.

Why this section exists

Before 23 September 2026 only Office files were refused here — and the message told the sender to “send the log itself, or gzip it”, which is not something you can do with a Word document. PDFs and images were not refused at all. The line parser keeps any line it cannot classify, so it never fails; it fabricates. Four kilobytes of random bytes with a PNG header measurably produced:

“18 events were read. … MEDIUM — Most events carry no parseable timestamp. 18 of the 18 events read carry it — 100% of the window.”

A severity, a remediation step and status: COMPLETED, about a file containing no events whatsoever. This is the same failure gzip decoding exists to prevent, arriving through a door nobody had checked.

Every image format, and two decoders

Verified end to end against dev on 23 September 2026 — one screenshot converted to each format and sent through this route: .png .jpg .jpeg .gif .bmp .webp .tiff .heic .avif all returned 200 with a transcript.

HEIC needs saying separately. sharp’s format list advertises heif and sharp cannot decode it: the prebuilt libvips ships no HEVC decoder, which shows up as source: bad seek to 260187 on a real file and not as a missing-format error. So AVIF (AV1) goes through sharp and HEIC (HEVC) goes through heic-convert. HEIC has been the iPhone default since 2017 and TIFF is what scanners emit, so before this the two formats most likely to arrive from a phone or a scanner were the two that were refused.

“The service was busy” is not “your image is unreadable”

The vision ladder used to try four models. They share one account, and the provider meters concurrency across all of them at once:

429 Concurrent limit reached for deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash: 5/5 slots in use
429 Aggregate concurrency limit reached: 10/10 total slots in use across all models

That second limit breaks the ladder’s premise. When the account is saturated — or Cloudflare 502s the gateway — all four rungs fail within milliseconds of each other, and the walk down consumes four more slots on the way. The response then reported the union of four identical infrastructure errors as a fact about the picture:

This image could not be read after trying deepseek-v4.1-flash, gemma-4-31b, qwen3.6-35b-fast, kimi-k3-fast … Describe what it shows, or paste the text from it.

Handed those exact bytes on demand, all four models read the file. Since 23 September a failure is classified before it is acted on: a 429, 502, 503, 504, timeout or reset retries the same model after 600 ms then 1800 ms inside the existing 90-second budget, because slots free up in seconds; only a failure the image itself caused moves down the ladder. A reason that cannot be classified is treated as permanent, which is the conservative direction.

When every attempt failed transiently the message says so, and says the opposite thing:

The image itself looks fine — every attempt failed because the vision service was busy or unreachable, not because of anything in the picture. Send the same file again in a few seconds.

“Re-crop your screenshot” and “wait ten seconds” are opposite instructions, and only one of them was ever given.

A decode complaint is a claim about the bytes the provider RECEIVED

The same brownout has a second face, and it looks nothing like the first. One request on dev, eleven seconds, from the container log:

13:50:46  deepseek-v4.1-flash  502  …the origin web server returned an invalid or
                                     INCOMPLETE response…        (retried ×3)
13:50:53  gemma-4-31b          400  Failed to load image: cannot identify image file
13:50:56  qwen3.6-35b-fast     400  same
13:50:57  kimi-k3-fast         400  same

cannot identify image file is PIL’s words for “these bytes are not a picture”, so it was classified permanent — the conservative reading — and three rungs ended the walk without one retry between them. But it is the provider’s account of what arrived at its decoder, and a truncated upload produces exactly that error. “Invalid or incomplete response” is the same event seen from the other direction. Handed the byte-identical payload — same prompt, same max_tokens, same 2200 px normalised PNG — four minutes later, every rung read it: 3127, 2030, 2068 and 2466 characters.

So the service now checks the claim instead of believing it. Before an image is sent, a decoder on the host reads the exact bytes that will go on the wire (sharp(...).stats(), a full pixel walk). The verdict has three states and the third one carries the design:

local verdict	meaning	a cannot identify 400 is then
true	a decoder here read these bytes	transient — retried on the same rung
false	our decoder refused them too	permanent — corroborated, not disputed
absent	no decoder installed on this deployment	permanent — unchanged behaviour

The absent case is the point. “Nobody asked” is not “we checked and it is fine”; reading it as a dispute would make every genuinely corrupt upload retry three times before failing with the same message.

Two details are load-bearing. The probe decodes rather than reading the header — a truncated PNG keeps a perfectly valid header, so a header read answers “yes, 3584×2164” about a file whose pixel data stops a third of the way in. And it runs at failOn: 'truncated', not the 'none' used for conversion (which reconstructs what it can and reports success, defeating the whole check) and not the stricter 'warning' (every macOS screenshot carries an iCCP chunk, and a colour-profile complaint is not a decode failure).

Claims about the model rather than the bytes — image too large, does not support image input, unsupported media type — stay permanent whatever the local decoder says. A valid image can still be too large.

When the dispute is what ended the walk, the closing sentence reconciles the two facts rather than leaving the reader holding both:

The file itself is a valid image — it was decoded here before it was sent, and the same bytes read fine on every model minutes either side of this. The vision service rejected the upload it received, which is what a truncated or interrupted transfer looks like from its end. Send the same file again.

The same message again — and this time the bytes really were broken

The section above is true and was not the whole story. Days later the identical warning came back, on the identical file, from a build that already carried the fix:

Screenshot 2026-09-10 at 1.03.15 PM.png was not analysed … no text could be read from it … (Request failed with status code 400 — the provider said: Failed to load image: cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object>). Describe what it shows, or paste the text from it, and I can work with that.

That last sentence is the tell. It is the permanent advice, and a disputed decode cannot produce it — so bytesVerified had not come back true, so a decoder on the host had looked at those bytes and refused them too. The guard was not failing. It was reporting, correctly, that the upload was not a picture.

The request log said why, and had been saying it all along:

bytes=1554581   ← the three files as the service received them
                  6,056 (logs.txt) + 19,390 (.md) = 25,446
                  leaving 1,529,135 for a screenshot that is 878,552 bytes on disk

1,529,135 is exactly Buffer.byteLength(png.toString('utf8')). The client had read the file as UTF-8 text and re-encoded it before sending: every byte that is not valid UTF-8 became the three-byte U+FFFD, the magic arrived as ef bf bd 50 4e 47 instead of 89 50 4e 47, and 331,777 replacement characters — 65% of the file — replaced the image. Replaying those exact bytes through the public API reproduced the owner’s response word for word.

The conversion is lossy and nothing downstream can undo it. Hundreds of distinct byte values collapse onto one character. So the service detects it and says so, in the sniffer, ahead of the signature table:

{ "code": "UPLOAD_NOT_BINARY", "statusCode": 400 }

This upload arrived corrupted: it was sent as TEXT rather than as binary data, so roughly 67% of its bytes were replaced with the Unicode replacement character in transit. The service received 1,529,135 bytes for this file — compare that with its size on disk, which will be SMALLER, because every byte that is not valid UTF-8 becomes three. That conversion is lossy, so the original PNG image cannot be recovered from what arrived. The file on your disk is almost certainly fine — this is the sending client, not the file. Attach it as a FILE rather than as a text value (with curl: -F "file=@/path/to/file"), then send it again. If that client cannot be made to send binary, encode it instead: base64 -i /path/to/file -o file.b64 and upload file.b64. Base64 is plain ASCII, so it survives the very conversion that destroyed this upload, and this endpoint decodes it back to the original bytes.

The byte count is in the message because the diagnosis is otherwise uncheckable. “This is the sending client, not the file” is correct and unverifiable from the caller’s chair, and the first version of this message said only that — so the same request was sent again, twice, unchanged. A UTF-8 round trip can only ever grow a binary file, so the received count beside one ls -l settles whose side the damage happened on without anyone having to be believed.

The service was ruled out by replay, not by reading its own parser. The multipart reader’s comment says it is byte-safe, which is exactly the claim under suspicion. So the same 878,552-byte file went through the live public endpoint in the shape PostmanRuntime uses — chunked transfer encoding, a per-part Content-Type: image/png, its User-Agent — and came back transcribed, logged bytes=22748 via=postman/Postman. Same client shape, same tunnel, same route, correct bytes.

⚠ bytes= in that log line is measured AFTER extraction, not off the wire. A 878,552-byte screenshot that transcribes cleanly is recorded as bytes=3561 — the size of the text read out of it. The original size survives only when extraction failed, which is why the damaged upload is the one whose true arrival size appears there. Reading it as a wire measurement will make a healthy upload look like a 250x shrink.

Three choices in that are deliberate.

It is not in the image path, even though that is where it surfaced. A .pdf, .docx or .xlsx sent the same way is damaged identically; those formats merely begin with ASCII magic (%PDF, PK), so they survive their first bytes and fail later and far less legibly. The sniffer is the one place every format and both upload routes pass through.

It is a 400, not a 415. “Unsupported format” is the wrong diagnosis for a file this endpoint reads perfectly well — the request was malformed, and a partner branching on the code has to be able to tell those apart.

Two conditions, because either alone is wrong. A wrecked PNG or JPEG signature is conclusive: an intact PNG never begins with U+FFFD. But %PDF and PK are the first bytes of every intact PDF and Office file, so a magic match only names the format in the message. And density alone would refuse a log full of mojibake — real text that went through a bad encoding upstream, dense in U+FFFD, and a file the caller is entitled to have analysed. So the damage must also look binary: a NUL byte in the scanned region, which every mangled PNG, PDF and Office file carries and ordinary text does not.

Refusing that log would have been this fix causing the exact harm it was written to end.

One more thing was wrong for exactly one deploy, and it is the same failure in miniature. The scan is bounded at 256KB, so on a 1.5MB screenshot holding 331,777 replacement characters the message read “roughly 67% of its bytes (58,362 of them)” — a count of the window stated beside a percentage, which reads as a count of the file. The share survives truncation; that is what a proportion is for. The count does not, and now appears only when the scan covered the whole file.

Uploads carried as text that can be put back

The refusal above is the last resort, not the first response. UTF-8 mangling is the one version of “sent as text” that destroys the file; the others are reversible exactly, and the endpoint reverses them before anything else looks at the bytes. Nothing needs to be declared and no parameter turns it on.

carried as	example	recovered
base64	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUg…, wrapped or not	exactly
a data: URI	…	exactly
latin-1 text	a client that read the file with latin1/binary encoding	exactly
UTF-8 text	the case above	never — refused

So this works, through any client that can send a text file at all:

base64 -i "Screenshot.png" -o shot.png.b64
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/log-analytics/$WORKSPACE" \
  -H 'Prefer: respond-sync' -F "file=@./shot.png.b64"

The upload is named shot.png in the response — the .b64 suffix is a statement about transport, not part of the filename — and the acknowledgement records what happened:

[log-analytics/public] BATCH-… accepted files=1 … recovered=[shot.png (base64)] […]

Base64 is the door to recommend to a client that cannot be fixed, and the reason is mechanical rather than a matter of preference: base64 is pure ASCII, so the UTF-8 round trip that replaces 65% of a PNG leaves it byte-for-byte identical. It arrives intact through the same broken client, with nothing changed at that end but the file picked.

Latin-1 and UTF-8 mangling look identical to a person and are not the same event. Both arrive inflated and unreadable. A latin-1 round trip maps 0x00–0xFF onto U+0000–U+00FF and back with nothing lost; a UTF-8 round trip collapses hundreds of byte values onto one replacement character. The size says which: the 878,552-byte screenshot above would be 1,285,602 bytes through latin-1 and 1,529,135 through UTF-8, and it arrived at 1,529,135. One of those is recoverable and the endpoint recovers it silently; the other is the refusal.

⚠ Decoding runs before every other decision, and the order is load-bearing. gzip detection, the archive refusal and the Office-container probe all read leading bytes, and on an encoded upload those bytes belong to the encoding. Run the other way round, a base64’d .gz is never decompressed and a base64’d .zip is never refused — both are handed on as text and analysed as though the base64 were a log, which produces a confident report over an encoding rather than an error.

⚠ The risk here runs opposite to the rest of the upload path. Everywhere else a mistake refuses something readable; here a mistake rewrites a file that arrived perfectly, then analyses whatever it happened to decode to. So an implicit decode must land on a signature the platform already recognises, and one that lands on nothing is abandoned with the file left exactly as it arrived. A log full of base64 — a JWT, a signature, a dumped payload — is therefore left alone, because it decodes to nothing identifiable. Only an explicit declaration (a data: URI, a .b64 name) is trusted without that, because there the caller has said so.

One response, two renderers — and only one of them had been fixed

Re-running the same screenshot on its own surfaced the other half. The summary was right and the paragraph beneath it was not:

field	said
summary.headline	“113 transcribed lines of a transcribed image, not log events.” ✓
overview (?summary=full)	“113 events were read. … 20 of the 113 events read carry it — 18% of the window.” ✗

The summary and the plain-English narrative are different renderers of the same facts, and the first fix reached one of them — the shorter one. ?summary=full now counts in the unit the file holds, drops the health clause and the span entirely (a picture has no time axis and no error rate), and measures a finding’s share of the file rather than of the window.

The scope is null the moment ANY file in the upload is a log: the merged counts then cover the log files only, so event is the correct noun for what is left and a document noun would mislabel it in the other direction. An upload holding several different document kinds — a write-up beside a screenshot — counts in records, the same neutral word the merged headline already uses.

A document is analysed, not counted as traffic

A file that is not a log — a written incident report, an XML document, the text read off a screenshot — is still read, still analysed and still reported with its own findings. Nothing is refused and nothing is dropped. What changed on 23 September 2026 is what the numbers around it claim.

The line parser never fails: it keeps any line it cannot classify, so every sentence of a markdown write-up became a record. A 259-line incident report measurably came back as:

"259 events, 1 error-level (0.4%)."
"Repeats 4x (non-error): e.g. ---"

The 0.4% is one sentence containing the word CRITICAL, divided by the number of sentences — a claim about a population made over a document. The --- is a markdown horizontal rule reported as a recurring failure shape. The same upload’s batch total read “424 events across 3 files” over a log holding 45 entries.

Now:

45 events across 1 log file, 0 error-level. 4 findings. 2 further files are documents
rather than a log (382 records), analysed and reported on their own.

	log file	document, markup or transcript
counted in	events	lines, elements, transcribed lines
error rate	reported	never — there is no population to take a share of
recurring patterns	reported	empty, not reworded
summary.eventsAnalyzed	summed into the upload’s total	counted in summary.documentRecords instead
cross-file correlation and the batch timeline	included	left out

documentRecords is absent when an upload holds no such file, so an all-logs response is byte-identical to before. Per-file numbers are unchanged — eventsAnalyzed, levels and errors stay exactly as measured on each file, and files[].file.contentKind names what it turned out to be. Only the merged totals and the wording changed.

Why the document is named in the same sentence

A smaller total with no explanation reads as “some of my files were ignored”. The headline says how many files were documents, how many records they held, and that they were reported — so the number going down is legible rather than alarming.

Turning it off

LOG_ANALYSIS_RICH_FORMATS=false sends every such file back as a 415 naming its format. That is not a return to the old behaviour — the old behaviour was neither reading nor refusing them.

GET /limits publishes all of this: extractedFormats lists what is converted, separately from acceptedFormats, and maxImagesPerRequest sits beside the file count.

Text encoding is detected, not assumed. UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32 are all read, with or without a byte-order mark. That matters more than it sounds: PowerShell’s Out-File and > redirection write UTF-16LE by default, so a Windows operator who pipes a log to a file produces one without choosing to. Read as UTF-8 that file does not fail — it yields a NUL between every character and a confident report over nonsense. When the file was not UTF-8 the response says so in warnings.

One file per request on the keyed route. Several files in one call is what the batch route is for; sending more here is refused with 413 TOO_MANY_FILES rather than analysed in part and reported whole.

Correlating across files

Since 4 September 2026 a batch does a second pass once every file has finished, and reports what the files say together that none of them says alone. It arrives as crossFindings[], beside the files[] you already read.

{
  "batchId": "BATCH-06e15fd9",
  "status": "COMPLETED",
  "summary": {
    "filesAnalyzed": 4,
    "eventsAnalyzed": 1284119,
    "timeRange": { "from": "2026-09-02T08:55:11Z", "to": "2026-09-02T10:31:48Z" },
    "correlationsFound": 2,
    "correlationBasisUsed": ["SHARED_SIGNATURE", "TIME_WINDOW"]
  },
  "crossFindings": [
    {
      "id": "X-1001",
      "scope": "CROSS_FILE",
      "severity": "CRITICAL",
      "category": "CREDENTIAL_EXPOSURE",
      "title": "The same failure appears in 2 files",
      "files": ["exec-agent.log", "db.log"],
      "correlation": {
        "basis": "SHARED_SIGNATURE",
        "confidence": "HIGH",
        "signature": "Server=<id>;User Id=<id>;Password=…",
        "contributors": [
          { "fileId": "FILE-aef3e7", "filename": "exec-agent.log", "findingId": "F-1001", "eventCount": 200 },
          { "fileId": "FILE-b21c04", "filename": "db.log", "findingId": "F-1001", "eventCount": 212 }
        ]
      },
      "evidence": { "eventCount": 412, "firstSeen": "…", "lastSeen": "…", "samples": ["…"] },
      "detectedBy": "rules"
    }
  ],
  "warnings": [],
  "files": [ "…unchanged…" ]
}

Nothing you already read changed shape. Four fields are new on the envelope — crossFindings[], warnings[], summary.timeRange, summary.correlationsFound and summary.correlationBasisUsed[] — and one is new on every per-file finding:

files[].findings[].fileId. Per-file ids restart at F-1001, so four files in a batch all publish an F-1001. id alone never said which file a finding was in; now (fileId, id) does. A cross-finding uses an X- prefix, so it can never collide with either.

What counts as a link

All five bases the schema declares are now produced, derived from the finished per-file findings and nothing else. The analysis itself is not involved, so a defect here cannot change what a single file reports.

Basis	Confidence	What it means
ID_JOIN	HIGH	The same request, trace, span or transaction id in two files. Since 9 September 2026. The only basis that does not require the two findings to be of the same kind, which is the point of it: a checkout timeout in the browser log and a connection-pool exhaustion in the service log are different categories, different severities and one request. Reported first, because it is the only basis that says the files recorded the same unit of work.
SHARED_SIGNATURE	HIGH	The same masked failure shape in two files. The parts that vary between two occurrences of one error are replaced before comparison, and so are the timestamp, the level and the emitting service — the service is exactly what differs between two files describing one fault, so leaving it in would mean this link could only ever match files from the same service. What remains must still be at least 24 characters, so a generic tail cannot become a HIGH-confidence link. Needs no timestamps at all.
TIME_WINDOW	MEDIUM	Findings of the same type and category whose windows share a common instant, overlapping by at least 50%. Both sides must be MEDIUM or worse.
ACTOR	MEDIUM	The same named principal or client address in two files. Since 9 September 2026. Like ID_JOIN it does not require the findings to be of the same kind — but a shared actor is one person, not one unit of work: an account generates thousands of unrelated requests in a day, so this is a lead to follow and never more than MEDIUM. Only the four detectors that group by actor contribute one, all of them security or threat detectors.
SHARED_CATEGORY	LOW	The same kind of finding in two files, with no shared window and no shared shape. Dropped entirely when something stronger already covers that category.

A time overlap is never HIGH. Coincidence is cheap in logs: two files reporting errors in the same minute is the most ordinary thing in any upload, and calling that one incident would make the whole section worth ignoring. window and overlapPct are there so you can judge it yourself.

Findings whose windows merely touch are not linked, and LOW findings never form a time link — they co-occur constantly.

ACTOR was the last basis named in the schema and not produced. It was absent for a plumbing reason rather than a semantic one — the actor breakdown lived on the internal signals and stopped there — and it now travels the same route the identifiers do, as evidence.actors[] on the findings that have one.

What it refuses is the point of it: a loopback or unspecified address (127.0.0.1, 0.0.0.0, ::1, 255.255.255.255) and the names a logger writes when it has no principal (-, unknown, anonymous, null, none, system, guest). Those appear in almost every server log, so joining on one would link every file in a batch to every other — the widest possible false positive.

When something stronger already covers the same two files, the actor agreement travels with it as alsoMatchedBy rather than as a second, weaker row saying the same thing.

Which finding carries the evidence

Both identifiers[] and actors[] are accumulated by the rule pass, over every event a detector matched. One finding per type:category is published, ranked by severity — so a HIGH model finding regularly outranks the MEDIUM rule finding that did the accumulating. The survivor now inherits the fields it lacks, because otherwise a decision about which finding a reader sees would decide which evidence exists, and a batch could lose its only cross-file link to a tie-break. A finding that never had either — a genuinely model-only one — is still joinable: its verbatim samples are scanned for both.

Joining on an identifier

A line carrying requestId=, request_id, X-Request-ID, correlationId, traceId, spanId, transactionId or a W3C traceparent header contributes that value to the finding it belongs to, and the finding publishes what it was seen with:

"evidence": {
  "eventCount": 412,
  "samples": ["…"],
  "identifiers": ["request:req-8f31c2", "trace:4bf92f35…"]
}

correlationId and requestId are read as one kind — a correlation id is the request id as it crosses a service boundary, and keeping them apart would refuse exactly the join this exists to make. trace, span and transaction stay distinct, so two files sharing a hex string for two different reasons are not linked.

What is deliberately not treated as an identifier: the placeholders a logger writes when it has none (none, null, unknown, all-zeros), a short run of digits (retry-id=7 is a counter, and collides across unrelated files constantly), and anything under six characters. A missed join degrades to the clock-overlap and category bases; a wrong one puts two unrelated services in one incident at HIGH, which is the failure this whole section exists to avoid.

An ID_JOIN names one contributor per file — a file that raised four findings about one request is one contributor to that request’s story — and orders them by when each file first recorded the id. That order is the path the work took, and the recommendation sends you to the last layer it reached rather than the first: the entry point holds the symptom, and a failure in the deepest layer is what the earlier files are reporting the consequences of.

A cluster that fails to form is degraded, never deleted

Until 9 September 2026 a TIME_WINDOW cluster that could not reach the 50% floor was discarded whole. Measured: three files carrying one request id reported the real chain, and the same three plus one unrelated file — a nightly batch job in the same minute, with its own request id — reported nothing from that basis at all. The unrelated file entered the cluster, pulled the common intersection under the floor, and took the other three down with it, after which the SHARED_CATEGORY grouping naming the batch job was the only answer left. An added file did not add noise; it deleted a finding the caller had seen a moment earlier.

A failed cluster is now retried on its subsets, and what the retry excluded is named in warnings[]:

Excluded billing.log from the elevated error rate window: it recorded a finding of the same kind in the same period but shares no common window with the others, so it is not part of that finding. The remaining 3 files are reported together.

When no subset qualifies either, that is said too, and the group falls back to the category basis — which is a weaker claim, stated as one.

Ordering and narrowing what you read back

GET /{workspace}/{batchId} takes these. They reshape the stored result and never change what was analysed.

Parameter	Values	Default
sort	severity, time	severity
order	desc, asc	desc
include	all, cross, files	all
minSeverity	CRITICAL … INFO	INFO
minConfidence	HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW	LOW
basis	csv of the bases above	all
type	csv of THREAT, SECURITY, COMPLIANCE, OBSERVABILITY	all
category	csv of finding categories	all
detectedBy	all, rules, model	all
file	csv of filenames or fileIds	all
trimBelow	a severity — below it a finding keeps its count and loses its detail	none
limit / offset	page crossFindings; max 500	100 / 0
fileLimit / fileOffset	page files[]; max 500	200 / 0

# the cross-file section alone, worst first — a few KB however many files you sent
curl "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analytics/<your-registered-name>/BATCH-06e15fd9?include=cross"

# a timeline instead of a ranking, and drop the detail on anything under HIGH
curl "…/BATCH-06e15fd9?sort=time&trimBelow=HIGH"

Three behaviours to rely on:

• An unrecognised value is a 400 BAD_PARAM, never a fallback. A filter that is silently ignored hands you a complete, successful, wrongly-scoped answer, and nothing in the response tells you it happened.
• summary is never recomputed by a filter. It keeps describing the batch that was analysed. What the filter did is reported separately under view — crossFindingsMatched against crossFindingsReturned, filesMatched against filesReturned. Otherwise narrowing to CRITICAL would let you read summary.findings: 1 and conclude the upload found one thing.
• sort=time puts undated findings last in both directions. Putting “we could not read a timestamp” first is the least useful thing an ascending read could hand you.

verbosity=concise is a different projection with its own merge rules. Combining it with a non-default filter is a 400 rather than one of the two being quietly dropped.

Reading the evidence on a cross-file finding

Each entry in correlation.contributors[] carries its own sample — one verbatim line from that file — and evidence.samples takes one line from each contributing file before a second from any. On a three-layer upload that gives you the traversal directly:

worksoft-portal-ui.log        73,577 events
    09:22:29 [ERROR] portal.ui - GET /api/execution/EXEC-88431/status 503 after 30014ms
worksoft-exec-agent.log       63,980 events
    09:21:19 [ERROR] agent.executor - ExecutionServiceException: result store unavailable
worksoft-certify-backend.log  57,582 events
    09:20:13 [ERROR] certify.db - Login failed for user 'certify_svc'. Reason: The
                     password of the account has expired.

The timestamps descend through the layers, so causal order is visible without opening a file. This matters more than it looks: taking samples file-by-file instead put three near-identical 503 lines from the top layer in every cross-finding, and the backend line naming the cause appeared nowhere.

What it costs, and what it will not do

• The pass runs once, after the last file — never on a per-file publish. At the 1000-file ceiling, correlating on every publish would be O(F³) rather than O(F²).
• Pairing is bounded: findings group by (type, category) first, and only the 50 loudest files per category are paired.
• Reported cross-findings are capped at 20. When the cap drops any, warnings[] says so. Silent truncation is the one outcome this route must not produce.
• A failure in this stage degrades to crossFindings: [] and a warning. It cannot fail the batch — losing 999 good per-file analyses to a defect in the second pass would be the opposite of what it is for.
• A batch of one file produces none, by construction. Every cross-finding names at least two files.
• ?shape=report and verbosity=concise are separate projections and do not carry crossFindings. Use the default envelope for cross-file results.

What Cortex shows from this response

The chat surface renders the report rather than summarising it, because everything below is already in the body and re-deriving any of it would be a second source of truth that can disagree with the first.

It is prose, not a widget. The report used to render as a collapsible card sitting beside the answer. A card is the right shape for something you consult and the wrong shape for the answer itself: the reader asked a question and got a control to open, while the chat’s own paragraphs — the part that reads like an answer — sat above it saying less. Every section below is now emitted as markdown into the assistant’s own message, so it is laid out by the same renderer as the rest of the turn and reads as one continuous answer. Measured on a two-index turn against live data: 1,541 words, against ~490 before.

Nothing is summarised in the process. Every number is copied from the body; the renderer chooses order and wording and computes nothing, so it cannot disagree with the server.

Working first, conclusion last. In order, top to bottom:

#	Shown	From
0	What was read, before anything is filtered	the turn, not the report — see More than one index
1	## Log analysis — <name> — <handle>	the source, named — see Naming the source
1	The headline	summary.headline — one sentence, so a reader can stop at line one
2	What YOU asked about	view.asked — the severity the question named, and whether it matched
3	Why this is happening, and what to do	description, recommendation and detectedBy on the leading findings
4	Findings, worst first, each with its evidence	the severity sections
5	What repeats, with a real line quoted	summary.topPatterns[] — label is the template, example is verbatim
6	What the service did	summary.activity
7	The numbers	eventsAnalyzed, errors, warnings, errorRate, levels, findings.bySeverity, findings.byType, timeRange, and the file facts
8	What the analysis could not do	warnings[]
9	The summary	overview and summary.highlights[]
10	Where to go next	derived from 3, 5 and 7 — see below

The summary used to open the report. That is the wrong way round for anything longer than a paragraph: a reader given the conclusion first has no reason to read the evidence, and a reader who wanted only the conclusion had to scroll past it to confirm the rest was there.

Every severity section is rendered, info included. A healthy index’s only finding is the INFO note the analyser writes about what the service does all day — with a description, a recommendation and evidence. It is the whole answer for an index with nothing wrong in it.

Every finding is written out in full. There is nothing to open, because there is no longer anything folded — the depth control decides what the RESPONSE carries, not what the page hides.

activity is omitted when the log records no request outcomes. The key is still sent on such files, with requests: 0 — a panel headed “What the service did” whose only row is “Requests 0” says the service served nothing, when what happened is that this is not a request log. The busiest hour is reported with the counted facts instead, because it is true of any log.

warnings[] is rendered even when every other section is empty — that is the case where it matters most.

The cause, under its own heading

The response has always carried a causal reading and a fix — description says why the finding is there, recommendation says what to do, detectedBy says how it was established. All three were rendered inside each finding row, where a reader looking for “so what is actually wrong” had to open every finding and assemble it.

They now also lead, under Why this is happening, taken from the findings ranked medium or worse — up to three, because a fourth cause is a list, not a diagnosis. Each says how it was determined, and the two are not equivalent:

detectedBy	Rendered as	What it means
rules	deterministic detector over the counted events	a threshold on numbers the parser counted
model	correlated across the evidence, with every quantity taken from the logs	a reading over the evidence pack, forbidden from stating its own numbers

On a healthy index the heading changes rather than the section disappearing. It reads Why it looks like this, followed by “Nothing in this window failed, so there is no fault to trace” — because a root-cause section that invents a fault to justify its own heading is worse than one that says there is none.

Naming the source

Each analysed source gets its own heading, and the heading is not the bare handle. aggregations.json is what a file happened to be saved as; log-analytics-2905-payments is a storage key with a tenant id in the middle of it. Neither is a name, and a reader looking at three headings in one turn had to decode all three before they could tell which finding belonged to which service.

A readable name is derived from the handle itself — nothing is invented — and the handle is kept beside it, because it is the only string that identifies the source unambiguously and the only thing anyone can paste into a search box.

Handle	Heading
aggregations.json	Aggregations — aggregations.json
authenticationservice_133-2905	Authenticationservice 133 — authenticationservice_133-2905
log-analytics-2905-payments	Payments — log-analytics-2905-payments
2905	2905 — stripping the id would leave nothing to show

Three parameters that were overruling the question

The composer used to send shape=report&summary=brief&depth=full on every call. Read the precedence rule above and the consequence follows: naming any of the three tells the server the caller has been explicit, and an explicit parameter outranks the question. So a reader who typed “give me an in-depth root-cause analysis” had that sentence discarded in favour of three controls sitting at values they had never touched.

The three controls now start on Auto, which sends nothing. resolveSectionIntent reads the sentence; moving any one of them still wins. narrow=false is still sent, because it is not a shaping parameter — it is the instruction not to delete anything.

This means the endpoint’s own default shape is what a reading surface receives, and that shape differs from the report shape in ways a renderer has to handle:

Fact	Report shape (shape=report)	Default shape
findings	severity sections (critical … info)	findings[]
a finding’s event count	events	evidence.eventCount
a finding’s quoted lines	evidence[]	evidence.samples[]
file facts	summary.files[]	file
the id to re-read the analysis	absent	analysisId

Both are normalised to one shape before anything renders. A surface that reads only the first form silently loses every event count and every quoted line the moment no shaping parameter is sent.

errorRate is a ratio

summary.errorRate is errors / eventsAnalyzed in 0..1, not a percentage. A file whose overview reads “1,509 errors out of 81,596 events (1.9%)” carries errorRate: 0.0185. Rendering it straight into a % sign prints 0.0% — wrong by two orders of magnitude on the single figure a reader uses to judge how bad a file is. Multiply before you print.

The question, answered rather than applied

With narrow=false the body is complete, so the question has to be visible some other way or the reader cannot tell it was read. You asked about critical leads the report with the findings matching view.asked, or — when none match — says so in one line and points at what was found instead:

No critical findings were raised for this index. Everything the analysis did find
is below.

Where to go next

The turn closes with one row of up to four follow-up questions, each quoting a number or a string the server counted: the worst finding by name, the pattern that repeated and how often, the busiest hour, and either a breakdown of the error-level events or — when there were none — whether any exist outside this window. A suggestion whose source fact is missing is not produced: a plausible follow-up about data that was never measured is worse than none, because it will be asked and answer nothing.

One row, not two. The chat answer suggests its own follow-ups and the analysis suggests these; rendered as separate rows that is eight questions at the foot of one turn, which is a menu rather than a suggestion. They merge into one list capped at four: the chat’s lead, because they were composed against the prose just read, and these top the row up. Duplicates are dropped case-insensitively, and a turn that already has four gets nothing added.

A question is built from the pattern’s label, cleaned of the level and the masked timestamp the analyser groups by — those are how lines are CLUSTERED, not what the line says. Why does "Logout PURL - https://…" repeat 154 times? rather than a question with DEBUG 2026-08-17 08:43:32.738 -05:00 [DBG] pasted into the middle of it.

More than one index

Selecting more than one index runs one call per index, concurrently. The turn then reads: one unconditioned opening line, a titled section per index, a combined reading, and one shared row of follow-up questions drawn from across them.

The opening line is the only sentence in the turn that is true regardless of what was asked — how many indexes, how many events, over what window, and whether anything in any of them was error-level:

Read 2 indexes: 1,351 events, 2026-08-14 19:53 → 2026-08-18 18:12 UTC (3d 22h).
No error-level events in any of them.

Every section beneath it is scoped by those facts and none of them states them. An index whose call failed is named here as unread and excluded from the totals — counting it as zero events would make a failure indistinguishable from an empty index.

The window is written one way everywhere it appears — the opening line, the Window fact and the server’s own summary.headline. It was three renderings of one range on a single screen, two of them raw ISO strings.

The combined reading is a rollup of the sections above it — every number in it is a sum or a copy — so it cannot contradict them, and an index whose call FAILED contributes no zero, because it was never read. One index gets no rollup: that would be the report above it, printed twice.

It concludes rather than repeats. It carries the merged overview and the combined total, and folds its findings to their titles: it states no cause of its own and prints no evidence, because every one of those was read in full in the section directly above. Restating them cost around 300 words, none of them new.

Finding ids are minted per analysis, so two indexes both return F-1001. The rollup re-keys each finding by its index (idx-a:F-1001) — merged under one id they are two rows sharing one identity, and expanding either expands both.

When some events are not retained

Findings are computed from the parsed events in memory, so they are complete whatever the store does. Retention is separate, and the response is explicit about which of the two failed.

An ECS log is the case worth knowing about. Datasets in this family carry a shared template that maps host, source, container and os as strings, and ECS makes every one of them an object — so those documents are refused on the first attempt.

They are not lost. The store names the field it refused and the type it wanted, which is enough to convert the offending field and re-send the document. eventsStored counts them and a warning says what was converted. The cost is honest: host becomes the JSON text {"ip":"10.0.0.4","name":"web-01"} rather than an object, so a full-text search for 10.0.0.4 still finds the row while host.ip: "10.0.0.4" does not. Send an ECS log to a dataset of its own if you need per-sub-field queries.

eventsRejected above zero with a warning naming fields means the repair did not work either. The finding half of the response is unaffected; status is PARTIAL, never a silent COMPLETED.

A store OUTAGE reads differently, deliberately: status stays COMPLETED — you asked for an analysis and got a whole one — and the warning says how much landed before the store went away.

Operator settings

Variable	Default	Purpose
LOG_ANALYSIS_API_ENABLED	true	Master switch; off makes every path 404
LOG_ANALYSIS_API_KEYS	(empty)	secret:workspaceId:label, comma-separated
LOG_ANALYSIS_PUBLIC_WORKSPACES	(empty)	name:workspaceId, comma-separated — the registered segments of the open route
LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_BYTES	262144000	Per-file ceiling on the keyed route
LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_EVENTS	3000000	Events analysed per file
LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_CONCURRENT	3	Analyses in flight at once; past it an upload is refused 503
LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_INFLIGHT_BYTES	201326592	Uploaded bytes in flight at once. The ceiling that decides whether the process survives — measured at ~7–11MB of process memory per MB of log
LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_EVENT_FIELDS	200	Distinct fields one record may add to a dataset before the rest are folded into additionalFields
LOG_ANALYSIS_PUBLIC_RATE_LIMIT	5	Uploads a minute per address on the open route
LOG_ANALYSIS_PUBLIC_READ_RATE_LIMIT	120	Reads a minute per address; polling must not spend the upload allowance
LOG_ANALYSIS_SHARED_STATE	true	Share idempotency reservations and async results between replicas
LOG_ANALYSIS_SHARED_STATE_INDEX	logrite-log-analysis-state	Where that bookkeeping lives — deliberately outside the log-analytics-* family
LOG_ANALYSIS_AI_ENABLED	true	Off leaves the deterministic findings, which are reproducible
LOG_ANALYSIS_RETENTION_MS	604800000 (7 days; was 24 h)	How long a result stays re-readable by id, listed, and eligible for reuse
LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_STORED	2000	Upload records the state index answers for per workspace — the ceiling on GET /api/v1/log-analyses?limit=
LOG_ANALYSIS_MEMORY_ENTRIES	200	Entries in each process-local map (re-read cache, idempotency keys). A miss falls through to the shared state index, which is authoritative — this bounds memory, not retention
PROXY_HOPS	1	Proxies we own in front of the service. Decides what req.ip reports, and therefore whether the IP allowlist and the per-caller rate limit work at all. A count, never true

Both route ceilings are enforced against a real measurement rather than a chosen number: scripts/load-log-analysis.js in the service repo produced them, and it should be re-run before either is raised.

With no keys configured the endpoint still serves session tokens — a partner integration simply has no way in until a key is issued.

Removing datasets you created

Listing and deleting your uploads (2026-10-07)

Every finished upload leaves a record, so a client can see and remove what it sent without touching indices. Both routes take the same credentials as GET /api/v1/log-analyses/{id} and only ever see the credential’s own workspace.

# newest first; default 50, capped at LOG_ANALYSIS_MAX_STORED (2000)
curl -s "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses?limit=50" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LOGRITE_API_KEY"

{ "analyses": [ { "id": "ANL-8f31ab27", "datasetId": "log-analytics-…", "fileName": "app.log",
    "bytes": 48213, "contentSha256": "…", "createdAt": "2026-10-07T09:12:44.120Z",
    "findings": 4, "bySeverity": { "HIGH": 1, "MEDIUM": 3 }, "status": "COMPLETED",
    "partial": false } ] }

A limit that is not a positive integer is 400 BAD_PARAM.

curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X DELETE \
  "https://aiservice.logrite.ai/api/v1/log-analyses/ANL-8f31ab27" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LOGRITE_API_KEY"   # 204

DELETE answers 204 and removes, for that one analysis:

• its dataset index — unless another live analysis shares it (a batch, window or named dataset= index holds other uploads’ events too), and only ever an index in this workspace’s own log-analytics- family;
• its raw file in log-uploads-<workspace> (the register record and its byte chunks);
• its stored result in the state index and its upload record.

An unknown id, an expired one, and another workspace’s id all answer the same 404 NOT_FOUND. A retried delete tolerates the parts already gone.

Operator clean-up of older datasets

Every upload creates or extends a dataset and nothing expires it. Measured on dev on 1 September 2026: 254 of the 303 log-analytics-* indices were written by this endpoint, holding 744MB, against a cluster with no lifecycle policy at all.

There is deliberately no blanket retention rule. The family is shared with collector agents, demo fixtures and eval data, and expiring somebody else’s records is a product commitment rather than a setting. What exists instead is a targeted operator tool that reports by default and deletes only what it can prove this endpoint owns:

node scripts/log-analysis-retention.js                        # report, 30 days
node scripts/log-analysis-retention.js --older-than 7         # report, 7 days
node scripts/log-analysis-retention.js --older-than 30 --apply

An index is a candidate only when every document in it was written by this endpoint. A dataset shared with another writer is listed and never touched.

Verifying a deployment

Two scripts in the service repo check a running deployment rather than a build:

BASE_URL=https://dev-aiservice.logrite.ai scripts/test-log-analysis-api.sh
node scripts/log-analysis-corpus-live.js          # labelled corpus, model ON

The first is the acceptance suite, organised by the defect each case would have caught rather than by the happy path. The second runs a labelled corpus — including adversarial cases that must NOT produce a finding — through a deployed build with the model enabled, and is the only thing measuring precision rather than recall.

scripts/log-analysis-replica-proof.sh covers what neither can see, because both talk to one base URL: run it with PRIMARY and PEER pointing at two processes sharing a cluster to check that a retry and a poll cross a replica boundary.